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ABSTRACT Today, a number of European states’ policies on religion aim at cre-
ating a nationalized Islam. In many Western European countries, the Min-
istries of the Interior have institutionalized ‘dialogue platforms’ to discuss 
issues of Islam, society, inclusion and extremism with Muslim actors. This 
reveals the implicit assumptions of these governments when talking to Mus-
lims. The underlying message is that Muslims pose a security threat to the 
state and society, a perception that is manifested in many countries, and 
that Muslims are seen simultaneously as a threat and an ally. This article 
analyzes the Ministry of Interior’s attempts to institutionalize Islam in the 
cases of Austria, Germany, and France and it compares these states in order 
to investigate different modes of operation, similarities and differences.
Introduction
Richard Traunmüller shows in his quantitative empirical study that there was an increasing tendency in the EU 27-member states3 from 1990 to 2011 to regulate religions.4 Although Traunmüller’s study speaks of a 
general trend and does not deal with differences in the states’ policies in regard 
to different religious communities, this trend is especially true for Islam. As 
Jonathan Laurence shows in his study, from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, 
“gone were the ad hoc responses […] and in came corporatist-style institu-
tion building and the establishment of ‘state-mosque’ relations.”5 Especially 
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, European countries became 
more and more interested in gradually taking “‘ownership’ of their Muslim 
populations because it grants them unique influence over organizations and 
leadership.”6 
By influencing how Islam should look, national governments aim at creating 
“the institutional conditions for the emergence of a French or German Islam, 
e.g., rather than just tolerating Islam ‘in’ France or Germany.”7 This reflects two 
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aims of these states: i) to free Muslims and disconnect them from an allegedly 
foreign policy agenda, especially from the influence of the embassies of their 
origin countries, and ii) to ‘moderate’ those Muslim organizations that have a 
transnational link to Islamist movements.8 Many authors share the observa-
tion that states want a domesticized, “democratic European Islam” in the con-
text of debates about Islam as constituting a threat to “security,”9 “integration,” 
and “European values,”10 while others also problematize the racial dimension 
that structures these attempts.11 
In most European countries, the initiative to create ‘state-mosque’ relations 
comes from Ministries of the Interior, which have institutionalized ‘dialogue 
platforms’ to discuss issues of Islam, society, inclusion and extremism with 
Muslim actors. For Muslim civil society actors, the main purpose of partici-
pating in these state initiatives is to negotiate the institutional incorporation 
of Muslim institutions into the political system, and the accommodation of 
Muslim religion, as Luis Manuel Hernández Aguilar shows for the case of 
Germany.12 While a number of analyses discuss these Islam policies on a Eu-
ropean level,13 in a comparative perspective in different European countries14 
or single cases such as Austria,15 Germany,16 France,17 or Great Britain, there is 
little critical research comparing Islam Politics on a cross-national European 
level.
One of the most quoted works by political scientists is Fetzer and Soper’s com-
parative study on the accommodation of Islam in Germany, France and Brit-
ain.18 Drawing on social movement theory, their main insight is that histori-
cally built church-state relations pre-structure the accommodation of Islam. 
This basically affirms the approach of path dependency as taught in theories 
of institutionalism, which is also shared by other authors.19 Tatari has added 
to the four theories of social movement theory (SMT) discussed by Fetzer and 
Soper (resource mobilization theory, political opportunity structure theory, 
ideological theories, and approaches highlighting the influence of church-state 
relations) a fifth explanatory factor, which is “to account for the religious tradi-
tions characteristic of a particular group.”20 Others rather questioned the SMT 
approach. For instance, Loobuyck et al. have demonstrated that church-state 
regimes did not have an impact on the institutionalization of representative 
Muslim organizations, which is an important critique of Fetzer and Soper’s 
work, who take the different treatments of Muslims –compared to the dom-
inant churches– by the state as given. In their analysis of cases in Belgium, 
France, Germany and the UK, they argue that “several states have abandoned 
their traditional methods when dealing with the institutionalization of Islam.”21 
They conclude with the observation of a trend that “transcends disparate re-
gimes and relies mostly on other factors such as acknowledgment of Islam, 
security and integration policy.”22 The evidence for this claim lies in the timing 
of the beginning of these policies alongside political incidents, explicit refer-
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ence to de-radicalization –or at the 
very least “dialogue”– and the call 
for a “European Islam” to replace 
a variety of Islamic trends and tra-
ditional Muslim cultural practices 
in Europe.”23 This approach draws 
on other authors’ work, who argues 
not to overemphasize state-church 
relations.24 
The debate and state policies tar-
geting Muslims reached a new level 
after the 9/11 attacks. Since then, 
there is a general trend in Europe 
characterized by “increased sur-
veillance and police activity around 
Muslim actors and organizations, 
banning of groups and deportation 
of radicals and greater limitation on 
the religious practice of Muslims” such as the minaret, headscarf, halal slaugh-
ter and male circumcision bans.25 Yükleyen argues that in the post 9/11 era the 
laissez-faire approach of many European countries vis-à-vis Islam and Mus-
lims “has been replaced by policies that monitor Islamic religious activities 
and by recognizing representative bodies that claim to speak in the name of 
all Muslims.”26 
In recent years, there has been more critical work that looks at Islam Politics 
from a perspective of race,27 discourse,28 postcolonialism,29 and critical studies 
such as the anthropology of secularism.30 This article draws on these works 
and uses a racism studies-informed postcolonial approach to look not at the 
specific accommodation of certain aspects of Islamic practices, but rather at 
the approach federal state agencies, governments and the states take to create 
what has been called Austrian, German or French Islam in those countries. 
These strategies operate on a different level and do not deal with specific fields 
of practice like chaplaincy or the institutionalization of Islamic Theology, but 
rather take the grand strategy of states and governments into account.
A Postcolonial Analysis of Islam Politics
Farid Hafez has drawn on Foucault’s notion of the dispositive, which is under-
stood to be made of “disproportionately heterogeneous ensembles, discourses, 
institutions, architectural institutions, regulating decisions, laws, administra-
tive measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral or philanthropic 
On the one hand, othering 
is used to draw a line 
between Muslims and the 
rest of the society, while a 
potential inclusion is made 
possible by the acceptance 
of the German language. 
On the other hand, with the 
intention of Germanization, 
the Muslim figure is subject 
to transparency, as is not the 
case with other churches and 
religious societies
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doctrines […] The disposition itself 
is the network that can be inter-
twined between these elements.”31 
He frames Islam Politics as a dis-
positive.32 In our analysis, we will 
make use of this dispositive analy-
sis to understand the approach of 
Austria, Germany, and France in 
their dealing with Islam. Although 
there is no uniform definition of 
postcolonial studies, a common 
ground to all approaches is that they 
deal in the widest sense with the na-
ture and the effects of colonialism.33 
Chandra proposes a postcolonial 
informed political science research program that is characterized by a stronger 
incorporation of non-Western knowledge, as well as an “openness to anthro-
pological and historical knowledge as well as area studies.”34 Chandra explic-
itly refers to three possible approaches, which are not meant to be exhaustive: 
(i) critiques of existing Eurocentric theories of comparative politics; (ii) bot-
tom-up ethnographic and historical understandings of politics in particular 
contexts; (iii) re-evaluating key political concepts such as the state, democracy, 
nationalism, and war in the light of different non-Western experiences.35
In a broader sense, Chandra is critically concerned with the Eurocentric 
knowledge production found in political science, especially regarding the so-
called ‘Third World.’ His concern is an appreciation of local knowledge, re-
specting the knowledge production of other human groups in the so-called 
Global South.36 Or as other decolonial theoreticians would say: It is about cre-
ating pluriversality instead of (Western) universality.37 For Chandra, postcolo-
nial studies share many of the interests and approaches which can be found in 
political science, such as critical race theory, feminist studies, etc.38 
Ziai argues additionally that postcolonial subjects within the Global North 
should be taken into consideration as a central category for domestic political 
relations.39 Ziai points out that postcolonial policy research is based on the 
usual methods used in political science, primarily qualitative research meth-
ods,40 as we use Foucault’s notion of the dispositive here.
The Construction of an Austrian Islam by the Austrian Government
Islam was already institutionalized in Austrian territory by the Islam Act of 
1912, following the Austria Hungarian Empire’s annexation of Bosnia Herze-
The Islam Act offers a 
subordinate role to the good 
Muslim, who enjoys recognition 
on the part of the state, and 
privileges over other Muslim 
subjects who are now under 
the IGGiÖ’s supervision and no 
longer stand directly only as 
associations under the state’s 
sphere of influence
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govina. In 1979, the Islamic Religious Community was established as a corpo-
rate body that represents the religious interests of all Muslims living in Austria. 
In early 2011, then-state secretary of the Ministry of Interior, Sebastian Kurz, 
presented the “Dialogue Forum Islam” as a means to “improve coexistence 
and increase the sense of belonging of Muslims.”41 This seemingly inclusive 
mode of speech, which superficially opposed discrimination and called for the 
improvement of the lives of Muslims, was used to support this new institution. 
But soon it became clear that this initiative attempted to introduce a new Islam 
Politics that differed from the state’s approach to other legally recognized reli-
gious communities and churches. It used an ambivalent discourse, which on 
the one hand is directed against racist generalizations about Muslims, while on 
the other hand co-opts right wing concepts such as counter-society, a concept 
developed from that of a parallel society.42 
Already during the press conference held in January 2012, Kurz declared that 
he aimed to amend the Islam Act of 1912 and draft a proposal for the Federal 
Government.43 A first draft was presented in autumn 2014 and was funda-
mentally criticized by legal scholars.44 Richard Potz regarded the draft of the 
Islam Act as neither conformable to law, nor non-discriminatory.45 According 
to Hafez, a number of articles in the law were legitimized with the help of an 
Islamophobic frame.46 Hafez reveals this with § 2.2 of the proposed law. This 
paragraph stresses that the Islam Act “comply with general state norms” as 
well as “their pre-eminence against internal religious societies or doctrine.”47 
According to Potz, this “formulation cannot be found in any other special law 
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of religion.”48 Minister of Cultural Affairs, Ostermayer, emphasized this aspect 
when presenting the draft: “A clear principle is that state law prevails over reli-
gious law.”49 According to Hafez, this discourse builds on those Islamophobic 
stereotypes that characterize the figure of the disloyal Muslim citizen. Indeed, 
no similar paragraph can be found in any other law concerning other religions 
in Austria. There is not a single similar rule and, according to the Austrian 
constitution, every religion must be treated in the same way under the law. 
The second aspect is the linking of the new Islam Act with the German lan-
guage. Kurz emphasized the importance of the German language from early 
on. For him, “the Islamic faith should be more transparent, understandable 
and open,”50 and Imams should speak German. The emphasis on the German 
language expresses two things: On the one hand, othering is used to draw a 
line between Muslims and the rest of the society, while a potential inclusion is 
made possible by the acceptance of the German language. On the other hand, 
with the intention of Germanization, the Muslim figure is subject to trans-
parency, as is not the case with other churches and religious societies like the 
Greek or Bulgarian Orthodox church or the Arab speaking Coptic Church. 
Thus, inclusion is only superficial. In a critical discourse analysis of the parlia-
mentary debates in the National Council and the Federal Council, Hafez also 
observes a partial takeover of right wing Islamophobic positions by members 
of the government parties, albeit more ambivalent and contradictory.51
A discussion between Kurz and far right FPÖ Chairman, Heinz-Christian 
Strache, reveals the concerns Kurz follows on the level of public discourse: 
“First, the primacy of Austrian law before beliefs is in the act. Second, the 
presentation of the beliefs in German, also of the Koran, is part of the act. 
Third, German as a language of instruction is self-evident. And fourth, I was 
the first politician who demanded that the sermons in the mosques be held 
in German.”52 Regarding the latter, Strache replied maliciously: “Mr. Kurz, I 
have already claimed this when you were not even in politics.”53 This summary 
briefly shows the extent to which the Islam Act is characterized by othering, 
and at the same time the dominant society is confirmed as an invisible actor in 
the background: an imagined, transparent, Austrian, German-speaking iden-
tity. All these aspects convey a linguistically bound identity construction of 
Austria, which in turn requires transparency from Muslims and is based on an 
assumed contradiction between Islamic practices and Austrian laws.
At the same time, the Islamic Religious Community (IGGiÖ) saw more in-
tense clashes. Many –especially smaller religious groups among Muslims– po-
sitioned themselves against the draft law and even forced the IGGiÖ to publish 
a comprehensive critique of the draft.54 Ultimately, however, the leadership of 
IGGiÖ agreed to the new Islam Act. The new constitution of the IGGiÖ was 
adapted in accordance with the basic conditions, thus strengthening the large 
associations by transforming them into public entities (Körperschaft öffentli-
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chen Rechtes), as was the case before 
only with the IGGiÖ. 
Simultaneously, the IGGiÖ was 
strengthened by gaining direct 
control over those smaller entities 
which were formerly outside the 
IGGiÖ’s direct sphere, since they 
had been organized under the As-
sociation Act and not the Islam Act; 
thus these entities lost their inde-
pendence. Put differently, the Islam 
Act offers a subordinate role to the good Muslim, who enjoys recognition on 
the part of the state, and privileges over other Muslim subjects who are now 
under the IGGiÖ’s supervision and no longer stand directly only as associa-
tions under the state’s sphere of influence.
In March 2017, the Anti-Face-Covering Act became part of the Integration 
Act. Article 2 (1) provides:
The objectives of this Federal Act are the promotion of integration by strength-
ening participation in society and securing peaceful coexistence in Austria. 
Integration is a comprehensive societal process. Its success depends on the par-
ticipation of all people living in Austria and is based on personal interaction.55
In case the law is broken, one is punished with a fine of up to €150 (Article 2.2). 
This repressive restriction will certainly affect only a small number of women, 
since there are only very few wearing a face veil according to media reports.56 
Before the Integration Act was put in practice, the government also discussed 
a headscarf ban for several professions such as police, military, judge and pros-
ecuters. In the end, the government refrained from an explicit prohibition in 
the law. The government agreed on a neutrality requirement in these profes-
sions. According to the spokesperson for the Ministry of Interior, it was said 
that the police uniform regulation now provides “that only that which is nor-
malized as part of the uniform is allowed. These are not religious symbols.”57 
The Ministry of Justice stated that there is currently “no immediate need for 
action.”58 Thus the liberal headscarf policy,59 which had prevailed for a long 
time in Austria, seems to have taken a turn. While in 2010, Sebastian Kurz had 
argued that he was against a headscarf ban, and condemned such a demand as 
populism, which does not serve the integration of Muslims,60 he now became 
the champion of this ban.
In the above-mentioned debate between Strache and Kurz, the latter referred 
to the Islam Act in the following way: “With the Islam Act, we contribute to 
While in 2010, Sebastian 
Kurz had argued that he was 
against a headscarf ban, and 
condemned such a demand as 
populism, which does not serve 
the integration of Muslims, he 
now became the champion of 
this ban
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the fact that there can be an Austrian Islam (literally: Islam of an Austrian 
imprint).”61 This should make it possible “to be, at the same time, a proud Aus-
trian and a Muslim believer.”62 This theorem of an Austrian Islam can be seen 
as a central discursive element of the Islam dispositive. It originates from an 
inner-Muslim discourse but was reframed by Kurz. The IGGiÖ, for example, 
spoke of an Austrian Islam already in 2003,63 and the Austrian Muslim Youth 
had used the notion of an Austro-Muslim identity already in the late 1990s.64 
Thus, Kurz simultaneously makes use of restrictive policies and a discourse 
of inclusion. Kurz uses a set of policies for his Islam dispositive. He calls for 
informing people about Islam and explains that “events such as expert confer-
ences with the participation of young people as well as brochures are measures 
which will enable a European Islam in the future.”65 
These measures are explicitly identified as strategic activities, which are also 
reflected in the publications of Kurz and other state actors of integration policy. 
A commentary entitled “European Islam: Muslims in the Midst of Society” was 
published in the name of Sebastian Kurz himself.66 Franz Wolf, who had been 
working in the ÖIF (Austrian Integration Fund) since 2003, and then became 
deputy office manager in the State Secretariat for Integration, is now manag-
ing director of the ÖIF, which is in close cooperation with the BMEIA.67 Wolf 
published an op-ed entitled “How much Europe does Islam need?”68 and con-
ferences with the title “How much Europe does Islam need?”69 were organized.
Kurz understands the European character of Islam as a disconnection from the 
global Muslim community: “The independence of European Muslims from 
states and parties in the Muslim world is growing. Muslims who are part of 
Austria and other European countries share the goals of a peaceful society, in 
which each individual can make a contribution.”70 Kurz draws a picture that 
is based on a discursive inclusion of Muslims as a “part of Austria and other 
European countries.” At the same time, this seemingly inclusive position draws 
an image which implies that only those Muslims who share the “goals of a 
peaceful society” live here. Like the colonial practice of the Habsburg mon-
archy, he designs a domesticated Austrian Islam in contrast to a foreign and 
dangerous Islam.
Kurz sums up this approach on the website of the ÖVP’s youth organization: 
“An Austrian Islam –there should not be any contradiction between being a 
faithful Muslim and a self-conscious Austrian,”71 a statement that would be 
widely shared by many Austrian Muslims themselves. He goes on: “I advocate 
for a European Islam, legally recognized –but without any financial depen-
dency from abroad. I advocate for European Imams born and grown up here… 
Imams financed from abroad are one of the largest integration and social pol-
icy problems and are no longer possible.”72 This is how Kurz promoted the new 
Islam Act. Hafez has already identified the strategy of the Habsburg monar-
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chy as one of the colonial separation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina from the Ottoman Empire in order to 
strengthen the authority of the emperor by means of 
religious separation.73 Divide and rule is reformu-
lated by disconnecting Muslims from transnational 
links and domesticating them.
As mentioned above following a conference of the 
BMEIA, the managing director of the ÖIF pub-
lished an op-ed in Die Presse, entitled “How much 
Europe does Islam need?”74 As in the colonial dis-
course of the Habsburg monarchy, we can observe 
an equation of Europe with progress. Here, Europe 
becomes a symbol for modernization and cultural 
superiority. In his explanations of particular ques-
tions of sexuality, we understand what Wolf means 
specifically. In his opinion, there are “limits of free-
dom of religion.”75 He argues that the IGGiÖ does not allow discussions about 
“swimming instruction for Muslim girls” and veiling with reference to their 
religious practice. Wolf ’s androcentric perspective presents a policy of sexual-
ity centered on the imagined hypersexuality of the Muslim man,76 which has 
to be regulated according to a well-known colonial practice of the “white men 
[…] saving the brown women from brown men.”77 A second focus in his op-ed 
is that Islam should learn from Europe the “separation of politics and reli-
gion.”78 Wolf argues that transnational connections should be dissolved, since 
this would have “fatal consequences on Islamic associations and organizations 
in Europe.”79 A central leverage for reform would lie in the institutionalization 
of theology chairs at Austrian universities. Austria and Europe are thus imag-
ined in the background as progressive examples of secular, gender-appropriate 
and enlightened social and political formations. Here, the main function of 
‘othering,’ the definition of oneself, becomes obvious.
The German State’s Attempts to Discipline Muslims through “National 
Dialogue” 
The Non-recognition of Islam from the State: Islam as an Outsider Entity
First of all, unlike Austria, Islam has never been recognized as “public entity” 
in German history. One may argue that this difference emanates from the 
historical experiences of both states. Austria first occupied (1878) and then 
annexed Bosnia Herzegovina with a substantial Muslim population in 1912. 
Consequently, Islam was recognized and institutionalized by the Islam Act of 
1912 in Austria. However, Germany did not have a substantial Muslim pop-
ulation in its history and therefore, there was no need to recognize or institu-
Muslims were mostly 
portrayed as inferior 
subjects who had 
to adapt to vaguely 
defined ‘German 
values,’ which were 
understood primarily 




ENES BAYRAKLI, FARID HAFEZ, and LÉONARD FAYTREARTICLE
tionalize Islam. This changed with the migration of Muslim guest workers to 
Germany in the post-Second World War era. As a result of this migration, the 
number of Muslims living in Germany reached nearly 5 million in 2018, which 
makes up 6.1 percent of the whole population.80 
However, there is a legacy of German colonial politics, as Levent Tezcan re-
veals in his work. Tezcan shows how many of the discursive positions held by 
the state in the German Islam Conference (DIK-Deutsche Islam Konferenz), 
which will be discussed more in detail later, had already been uttered during the 
two colonial conferences, where it was declared that Islam must be civilized.81
One may argue that the German state ignored the new migrants and their re-
ligion for quite a long time, since first it believed that the guest workers would 
return to their countries, and second they were tolerated under a multicul-
turalist paradigm.82 However, this relaxed attitude started to change after the 
end of Cold War with the portrayal of Islam as the new “Other” of the western 
world, which also coincided with the realization that the guest workers were 
not going to leave as expected. There followed an intense public debate and 
an effort by different state actors to ‘integrate’ or, better put, ‘assimilate’ these 
new subjects to Germany. In these debates Muslims were mostly portrayed as 
inferior subjects who had to adapt to vaguely defined ‘German values,’ which 
were understood primarily as secular, yet having a Judeo-Christian heritage.83 
The German Islam Conference: Shaping the Rule of Deliberation from the 
Top-down
Like other European countries, Germany also became more and more inter-
ested in establishing a control mechanism over its Muslim subjects under the 
pretext of creating an institutionalized ‘dialogue’ mechanism. In this regard, 
the establishment of the German Islam Conference by the Interior Ministry 
of the Federal Republic in 2006 was a turning point to regulate Islam on a na-
tional scale in Germany.
The DIK is a regular event organized by the Ministry for the Interior, which 
selects the participant organizations as well as the topics discussed. Through 
DIK, the Federal Republic of Germany aims to set a range of recommenda-
tions concerning the regulation and control of Islam that each individual state 
Germany also became more and more 
interested in establishing a control 
mechanism over its Muslim subjects under 
the pretext of creating an institutionalized 
‘dialogue’ mechanism
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within the republic (Land) might implement. In Germany, the supervision of 
faith and its regulation (tax, teaching, organization, etc.) belong to each Land. 
Therefore, there are as many regulations over Islam as the number of Lands (up 
to 16). Each Land decides whether religious organizations (and which one(s) 
and how) should be recognized as a “public entity” (Körperschaft öffentlichen 
Rechtes), and therefore as able to levy taxes on its members (fiscal jurisdiction) 
and to employ public officials (especially for religious teaching). 
In order to be officially recognized by the German government as a ‘public en-
tity’ and to benefit from the specific rights of this status, such as levying taxes 
on its members (fiscal jurisdiction) and employing public officials (especially 
for religious teaching), German law requires that a religious society should 
represent the entire religious community, should have a centralized organi-
zational structure, and should have permanency. Because of the non-unified 
nature of Sunni Islam, it is extremely difficult for Muslims to achieve these re-
quirements.84 Only one small Muslim community has managed to obtain this 
status so far. In 2013 the German federal state of Hessen granted the Ahmadi-
yya Muslim Jamaat with the status of “public entity” (with 35,000 members) 
despite the contestation of mainstream groups such as DITIB (Turkish-Islamic 
Union for Religious Affairs).85
At the first German Islam Conference, the former Minister of the Interior, 
Wolfgang Schäuble, declared the main aim of the conference, stating: “We want 
enlightened Muslims in our enlightened country.”86 This declaration explicitly 
implies that Muslims need to be “enlightened” and that there are Muslims who 
are not “enlightened,” which can also be understood in the context of ‘the good 
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and bad Muslim’ narrative. In this context, the main 
function of the German Islam conference become 
clear –that is to say– to civilize Muslim subjects, a 
project reminiscent of the discourse of the “white 
man’s burden” in the age of colonization. 
According to its declarations, the DIK aims to ad-
dress specific problems in the Muslim community, 
such as concerns about the threat of terrorism, rad-
icalization and extremism that emerge from ‘par-
allel societies’ (Muslim ghetto), ‘Islamism,’ gender 
inequality in Muslim communities, anti-Semitism 
in Muslim communities,87 the lack of integration of 
Muslims living in Germany, the introduction of Is-
lamic religious studies in German in state schools, 
the training of local imams, establishing Islamic theological faculties in Ger-
man Universities, and reporting in the media.88
Defining Islam as a Security and Cultural Issue through DIK, New Theological 
Faculties, Media Discourses and Legislative Measures
As can be seen above, the DIK is an ambitious project which aims to tackle 
many areas regarding Muslims and therefore can be seen as the main tool of 
the German State to create a national Islam. The DIK has two main goals: first, 
the integration of Muslims in German society, and second the institutional 
integration of Islam. In 2006, the Government declared the aim of the confer-
ence as “a better religious and social integration of the Muslim population in 
Germany. On the one hand, it is implied that a ‘better integration’ of Muslims 
and the institutional integration of Islam will prevent radicalism and terrorism. 
On the other hand, the segmentation of Muslims in Germany is being coun-
tered.”89 The 2008 interim resume of the DIK states that: “Integration demands 
a much greater level of adjustment by the immigrants, particularly in terms 
of attitudes of the receiving society that are based on German laws, German 
history, and German culture.”90 Integration is thus described as Muslims’ ad-
aptation of “German” laws, history, culture, values, and language, all of which 
are associated with liberalism and secularism. However, as Müller puts it there 
is no consensus in Germany on what integration into “German culture” and 
“German values” really means.91
Hernandez argues that the declared goal of the DIK to “integrate Islamic insti-
tutions into existing institutional structures in Germany” poses a dilemma for 
Muslims. On the one hand, Muslims want to enjoy the “additional rights asso-
ciated with the institutional integration of Islam;” however, on the other hand, 
this institutional integration puts them under the control and regulation of the 
state authorities. Furthermore, this integration is also framed as a necessary 
The main function 
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cooperation in national security matters to prevent the alleged radicalization 
of Muslims. Hernandez concludes that the racialization of Muslims is central 
to the integration project of the German government.92 Foner also argues that 
“Islam in Western Europe is like race in the United States and Muslims share 
the same fate and face the same barriers as blacks in the United States.”93
The fact that Germany decided to institutionalize its relations with its own 
Muslim population only after 9/11, and the ensuing problematization of Mus-
lims as a security threat in the western world, speaks volumes. This focus on 
preventing radicalism, extremism and terrorism can be seen in the statements 
of the German Conference throughout the years. Therefore, one can claim that 
behind all of the declared goals of the DIK one issue stands out: that of pre-
venting terrorism through the securitization of Islam and Muslims. Cesari de-
fines “securitization as exceptional measures and procedures outside the rule 
of law, justified by emergency situations that threaten the survival of the polit-
ical community.”94 In this context, Muslims are portrayed as both an external 
and internal threat to the survival of German society, the state and its ‘values.’ 
This justifies the extraordinary measures of the German state vis-à-vis Mus-
lims, such as its interference into the religious affairs of Muslims, although the 
German constitution’s principles of neutrality and parity regarding religions 
requires that as a secular state it has to treat all religions equally and should not 
be involved in intra-religious disputes among Muslims.95
Müller analyzed the statements of the DIK and finds that the definition of ex-
tremism and radicalism used by the DIK is quite vague. For instance, the DIK’s 
concluding declaration of 2008 states that, “even if it is not encouraging people 
to support violence, the teaching of Islamist educational content can have a rad-
icalizing effect.” This very broad and vague definition of “extremism” and “radi-
calization” beyond the support and call for actual violence is quite problematic, 
since terrorism should be the main indicator for the definition of radicalism 
and extremism. Müller notes that even the highly controversial “Prevent Strat-
egy” of the UK provides a more exact definition, with terrorism as the main 
indicator of radicalization, defining the latter as “the process by which a person 
comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism.”96 
What is more problematic is the climate of pressure and fear inside the DIK 
which forces Muslim associations to accept highly problematic definitions 
which are formulated and imposed by state officials, most of the time without 
consulting Muslim associations. Müller notes that, 
the analysis of DIK documents demonstrates, the official positions of Islamic 
umbrella organizations were very conciliatory to the intentions expressed by 
state officials. However, in settings of anonymized interviews, Muslim partici-
pants of the DIK have expressed serious doubts about the DIK and its effects… 
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one participant of IGMG claimed that the minutes and protocols that were 
prepared by state agencies did not reflect the actual debate and the controver-
sies therein. Also, publications and agreements allegedly contained statements 
that were not even talked about in the discussions. To the contrary, as a rep-
resentative of the ZMD claimed, there was a significant pressure exercised to 
‘waive through’ the documents state employees had prepared in advance. The 
Islamic organizations in turn yielded to the pressure because they did not want 
to produce any scandals.97
Islamic associations that oppose these pressures risk being labelled as “bad” 
Muslims, i.e. radicals and extremists. Although none of the participating Is-
lamic organizations agreed with the DIK outcome document of 2008, only 
IRD (Islamischer Rat Deutschland, Islamic Council of Germany), which also 
includes the IGMG, openly opposed and refused to support the statement of 
the roundtable “Security and Islamism.” What followed was a stern warning to 
all other participating Islamic associations, and a prime example of State intim-
idation against Muslims in Germany. Just a couple of months after this contro-
versy between the IRD-IGMG and DIK, six administrators of the IGMG were 
“prosecuted and charged with fraud, money laundering, support of a terrorist 
organization, and foundation of a criminal organization. In 2009, there were 
several large scale raids that received major media attention.” Consequently, 
the IGMG and IRD were excluded from DIK and the Interior Minister, de 
Maizière, asked other participating Islamic organizations to openly denounce 
IRD and IGMG and draw a clear line between peaceful and violent Islamism. 
Here it is clear that Muslim organizations are asked to follow interpretations of 
state authorities without questioning them.98 
It is clear that Germany’s Islam dispositive not only consists of DIK and its ini-
tiatives but also includes the establishment of new institutions such as Islamic 
theology faculties with the aim of raising imams in Germany,99 court orders 
regarding the religious practices of Muslims such as the headscarf ban, media 
discourses about alleged parallel societies and Muslims as a security problem, 
surveillance of Muslim NGOs and mosques,100 and countless other initiatives. 
The ultimate aim of these initiatives is a domesticized national Islam, which is 
represented by the state-approved ‘good Muslims.’
The French State’s Attempts to Discipline Muslims through a 
Hierarchical National Structure
The French State’s attempts to organize local Muslims into a kind of “church” 
hierarchical structure reflect also a general will to control its members and 
to drive them into a nationalized (French identity) and enlightened (secu-
lar) practice of their religion. At the same time, the different state programs 
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intended to establish a “French Islam” structure 
are working as the catalyst of a general dispositive 
that includes laws, discourse, political statements, 
education directives, all aiming to discipline local 
Muslims. 
Muslim as a Particular Form of the Excluded
From 1990 to 2016, French governments of both the 
left and right wing created several official structures 
in order to organize, control, and ‘modernize’ Islam 
in France. Although these different policies do not 
constitute together a monolithic and coherent orga-
nization of Islam, they produced an intertwined set 
of mechanisms that all aim to control and influence 
–from the top– the way Muslims practice their faith 
in France.101 On one hand, this complex dispositive seems to have been first 
conceived as an answer to the “Consular Islam,” that is the policy of delegating 
the management of Islam to their countries of origin of the post-1945 migrant 
workers, especially Algeria, Morocco and Turkey.102 On the other hand, poli-
cies of organizing, controlling and modernizing Islam rely on the old colonial 
discourses that promote the domestication of the “good Arab” as described by 
Hajjat.103 Furthermore, the fact that in France the Minister responsible for faith 
affairs is the Interior Minister implies de facto a relation based upon security 
and control. Yet these measures contradict the principle of French secularism 
(the concept of laïcité), particularly as developed in the 1905 law, which im-
poses a strict separation between the State and religious organizations.104 
It is not a coincidence that the French authorities first attempted to organize, 
control and modernize Islam at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s. Indeed, this period saw the transformation of the “Arab immigration 
problem” into a “Muslim problem” in the rhetoric of most of journalists and 
policymakers.105 Although this semantic shift implied new policies (such as 
the top-down organization of Islam discussed here), these new measures relied 
on an old and ongoing French post-colonial dispositive towards North Afri-
can workers and families established in the national territory. This dispositive 
constitutes a range of segregating discourses materialized in law, urbanism and 
symbols that seek to relegate the targeted population to subaltern jobs, to the 
city’s periphery (suburbs), to limited social rights and to poor civic participa-
tion.106 In other words, through various measures and statements, the French 
authorities defined the North-African population as the “other,” i.e. those who 
are not like French people and are not fully legitimate to live in the country.107
In the 1980s, France assisted the rise of Arab-origin French visibility in the 
public sphere but also witnessed the rise of the far right party in reaction. 
The attempts at 
organizing and 
controlling Islam by 
both left and right 
wing governments rely 
upon a common post-
colonial discourse of 
“domestication”
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Hajjat claims that the civil rights movements launched by segregated Arab-or-
igin French people, such as the March for Equality and Against Racism (1983), 
led to a conflict between the established (the French elites) and the outsid-
ers (the Arabs), the first trying to direct the second into social differentiation 
and exclusion.108 The pressure upon immigrated populations increased further 
when the far right party “Front National” got historical results at the 1984 Eu-
ropean elections (11 percent), the 1986 Parliamentary elections (10 percent) 
and the 1988 Presidential elections (14.4 percent).109 It is in this context that 
the “Arab immigration problem” became a “Muslim problem” at the end of the 
1980s, following the Islamic Salvation Front’s victory in the Algerian elections 
and the consecutive civil war (1990-1991), the exclusion of three girls wearing 
headscarves at the secondary school of the northern city of Creil (October 
1989), and the Iranian Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie and his Sa-
tanic Verses.110
Establishing National Structures in Order to Resolve the “Muslim Problem”
All these elements laid the ground for a reform of France’s Islam policy. In 
March 1990, the Interior Minister and socialist Pierre Joxe launched the Con-
sulting Council on Islam of France (Conseil de Réflexion sur l’Islam de France 
–le CORIF). By so doing, Joxe became the first Minister since decolonization 
to implement a public policy that aimed to frame the representation and the 
organization of Islam in France.111 The Council was composed of six French 
Muslim personalities that deliberated practical issues of French Muslims and 
proposed non-binding recommendations to the Interior Ministry.112 Although 
this Council does not seem to have left a great impact on the structure of Is-
General view 
taken at the start 
of the German 
Islam Conference, 
organized by the 
Interior Ministry 
in 2006, and a 
turning point to 
regulate Islam on a 
national scale. 
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lam in France, it constituted the first attempt to 
control and influence the Muslim faith in France 
by the State. Indeed, Solenne Jouanneau argues that 
Pierre Joxe designed a specific discourse on Islam 
based on security, nationalizing and modernizing 
that all his successors will endorse.113 For instance, 
Joxe stated that he would fight “the development of 
‘savage’ mosques with radical, intolerant and violent 
imams” through “the establishment of institutes that 
would train French imams.”114 Similarly, Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement, the Interior Minister between 1997 
and 2000, stated “I have analyzed carefully previous 
political efforts for integrating Islam into the na-
tional community. I share the same goal: support-
ing the rise of a French Islam (Islam Français) […] a 
modern Islam in our territory;”115 Sarkozy, the Interior Minister between 2002 
and 2005, stated that “clandestine Islam is a threat, because radicalism comes 
from clandestine networks while civic participation leads to integration and 
then to a form of normalization;”116 and Bernard Cazeneuve, Interior Minister 
between 2014 and 2016, declared that his goal was to “produce a Republican 
Islam,” with the aim that “every Muslim –alongside the whole French people– 
get engaged in the total defense of the Republic against terrorism, Salafism, 
because the Republic is their first affiliation.”117 Because of this common ideo-
logical approach, some scholars affirm that the attempts at organizing and con-
trolling Islam by both left and right wing governments rely upon a common 
post-colonial discourse of “domestication.”118 
The second attempt to organize Islam by the State came from the Gaullist 
Charles Pasqua (1993-1995) who tried to base his policy mainly on the Alge-
rian network and the Great Mosque of Paris. The Advisory Council for Mus-
lims in France (CRMF) was created, made up 80 representatives. Pasqua also 
supported the nomination of seven regional Grand Muftis by Dalil Boubakeur, 
the president of the Great Mosque of Paris, as well as the creation of a training 
institute for religious scholars beside the mosque (the Ghazali Institute).119 Yet 
these structures felt apart in 1995 due to the exit of the Moroccan representa-
tives who refused the hegemony of the Algerian network.120 This failure shows 
that Muslim federations are not totally passive vis-à-vis the state’s initiatives, 
and develop –sometimes– strategies of contestation.121 
The third important attempt came from the socialist Jean-Pierre Chevènement 
(1997-2000) who organized discussion platforms (the istichara) that included 
a large scope of French Muslim trends. The goal was to encourage French Mus-
lim communities to organize themselves within a framework designed by the 
State.122 As an example of the state’s intervention, the Interior Minister im-
This continual state 
intervention into 
Muslim’s affairs did 
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posed upon French Islamic feder-
ations, non-affiliated mosques and 
prominent figures, the signature of 
a charter as a prerequisite for their 
participation in the consultation 
process. Through this charter, the 
state revealed its agenda on Islam: 
respect for the French law, the 1905 
secular principles, French language, 
the fight against radicalism, equality between men and women, and respect of 
apostasy in Islam. In brief, Islam was perceived as a threat to French principles 
even before the beginning of the policymaking process. In summer 2001, all 
the parties involved presented “an agreement for the future organization of 
the Muslim religion in France,” laying the grounds for the forthcoming French 
Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM).
Two years later, the process was completed under the vigorous impulsion of 
Nicolas Sarkozy (2002-2005) with the official creation of the CFCM on May 
28, 2003. The CFCM aims to be the interlocutor of the French State on ev-
ery issue relative to Islam and Muslim worship in France through a national 
council and regional councils. CFCM presents a pyramidal structure in which 
French Muslims elect delegates (the number of delegates is determined by the 
size of the mosque), that then elect a national board, which elects a directional 
board and this latter elects a President. The creation of the CFCM seems to 
come from the alliance between the three main French Muslim federations –
the Great Mosque of Paris (Algeria), the UOIF (Muslim Brotherhood) and the 
National Federation of the Muslims of France (Morocco)– under the Interior 
Ministry’s pressure.123 On one hand, Sarkozy met many French Muslim fed-
erations (including the Muslim Brotherhood UOIF) and repeated that “there 
[was] no project to standardize Islam, to differentiate or distinguish an official 
one. [Muslim federations’] internal debates are not the business of the Repub-
lic.”124 On the other hand, he directly nominated the president of the Mosque 
of Paris (Dalil Boubakeur) at the head of the CFCM in 2003 and 2005 though 
his poor score in the organization’s elections.125 Besides intervening directly in 
the CFCM Presidential nomination, Sarkozy indicated what kind of Islam he 
was waiting for: an Islam “fully integrated in the Republic… with representa-
tives fully integrated and trained in the Republic.”126 His discourses focus on 
the role of imams and the use of the French language in sermons and religious 
courses. Therefore, though a liberal appearance, Sarkozy clearly promoted 
state interventionism into Muslims’ affairs. 
In parallel to the CFCM structure, the same government launched under the 
initiative of the Gaullist Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, the Foun-
dation for the Oeuvres of Islam of France (Fondation pour les Oeuvres de l’Is-
The current French President 
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lam de France) in 2005. The project aimed to organize fundraising in order 
to finance mosques under the supervision of the State. However, this Foun-
dation has never been implemented. In 2015, the Interior Minister, Bernard 
Cazeneuve, tried to launch it once again under the name Foundation for Islam 
of France (Fondation de l’Islam de France). It was intended to be a consult-
ing Council that would empower an “autonomous and Republican” Islam of 
France. Surprisingly enough, the Interior Minister chose to nominate another 
former Interior Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, as the head of the Foun-
dation, demonstrating the state’s lack of confidence in French Muslim actors. 
The Foundation’s website presents the aim of the project through a statement 
of the French orientalist Jacques Berque: 
I don’t want for France a “French Islam” but an “Islam of France,” that is a Gallic 
Islam, I mean an Islam aware of modern societies’ issues, an Islam that resolves 
problems that it never had to resolve in the past. Figure out the repercussion of 
such Islam in the rest of the Islamic world!127
Many French Muslim/Arab intellectuals, such as Abdennour Bidar, calling for 
an “enlightened Islam,” applauded the creation of this foundation.128 
Bottom-up Initiatives and the Difficulty of Escaping from the Islam Dispositive
This continual state intervention into Muslim’s affairs did allow the state to 
impose its agenda upon Muslim federations, i.e. its concerns for identity, se-
curity and Modern Islam. Yet, these different structures failed to reach many 
other objectives: they did not manage to represent the French Muslim com-
munities, they did not manage to propose clear policies on Muslim issues that 
really reflect the religious needs of Muslims (imam training, halal certification, 
mosques financing etc.), and they did not take over the role of countries of 
origin (“Consular Islam”) in French Muslim affairs. Indeed, the difficulties of 
the CFCM –the biggest and most elaborated structure of all the mentioned 
attempts– reflect an ongoing competition between foreign countries, organi-
zations and egos.129 Some French Muslim social activists such as Muhammad 
Marwan, the former president of the CCIF (Collective against Islamophobia in 
France), attribute this failure to state interventionism, perceived as an attempt 
to impose top-down policies upon Muslim communities. 
However, the constant production of laws targeting Muslim citizens,130 the in-
crease of terror attacks over the last five years, and the use of a hard discourse 
on laïcité in response to the phenomenon of radicalization,131 have not en-
couraged the State to proceed in any reform of its policy towards Muslims. In 
fact, the current French President of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron, seems 
to carry on the same post-colonial dispositive while presenting a face of re-
form.132 Attending the CFCM’s iftar dinner on June 21, 2017, he defined three 
“fights” (“combats”) that a new “structuring”133 of French Islam must carry out: 
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“a fight of thought and faith, espe-
cially towards young generations 
[…] a second fight against a certain 
practice of Islam that organizes a 
segregation within the Republic 
[…] a third fight focused on imams’ 
training; they should be trained in 
France, suitable with Republican 
values.”134 Security, identity, and 
imam training… these issues have 
been the privileged tools to shape 
the “good Muslim” for 30 years. The 
next months will tell us how Ma-
cron plans to carry on his “French 
Islam” policy and to what extent it does reflect the on-going post-colonial dis-
positive to manage Muslim populations. 
Conclusion 
Through the analysis of Interior Ministers’ statements and policies, this arti-
cle underlines the policy continuum between quite different states (Austria, 
Germany and France) in regard to the organization of Islam. Although each 
country presents its own historical background and means to regulate the re-
lation between the state and its religious communities, they all manage a dis-
positive that aims to structure Islam and to discipline Muslims. This article 
demonstrates how this dispositive constitutes a set of actions and injunctions 
going back to colonial times in dealing with the “other,” including discourses 
on security, control, integration, assimilation, domestication, ownership, dif-
ferentiation between “bad” and “good” citizens, etc. As a result, the organiza-
tion of a national Islam aims not only at the establishment of an official Muslim 
representation (the state-mosque approach) but also the subordination of one 
religion under the domination of the state (the post-colonial approach). In 
this asymmetrical relation of power, the state tries to shape the form and the 
content of this religion, i.e. Islam, by imposing is own agenda from the top. 
Many of the measures taken to regulate Islam-state relations reveal an ap-
proach that on one side attempts to give Islam a place in their society, while on 
the other side clearly refers to a stereotypical imagination of the Muslim, where 
the notion of Europe stands for enlightenment, modernity and progressive-
ness, while Islam and Muslims represent the opposite. Hence, we can observe 
a notion of ‘civilizing’ Islam that goes back to colonial times and introduces a 
division between the good and the bad Muslim; the former who submits to 
the state and its rules, versus the latter, who remains the uncivilized, barbaric, 
The Islam dispositives revealed 
here show that the states 
legitimize their interference 
based on this implicitly 
reproduced imagination of 
the bad Muslims, and thus 
endeavor to ‘civilize’ Muslims 
subjects, reminding us again of 
the “white man’s burden”
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alien Muslim, prone to extremisms and fanaticism and incapable of fitting into 
modernity. The Islam dispositives revealed here show that the states legitimize 
their interference based on this implicitly reproduced imagination of the bad 
Muslims, and thus endeavor to ‘civilize’ Muslims subjects, reminding us again 
of the “white man’s burden.” 
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